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The use of statistical risk assessment tools is growing 
in many different areas of the criminal justice field.  This Note 
critiques this growing trend towards using risk assessment 
tools during the sentencing phase.  Part II of this Note will 
survey the differing types of risk assessment tools used across 
the United States to track the development of risk under the 
assessment protocol standards of the criminal justice systems.  
Part III will review the current criticisms on actuarial risk 
assessment.  Part IV will outline the proposed risk assessment 
tool Pennsylvania is currently developing.  Finally, Part V will 
weigh Pennsylvania’s model against the criticisms of actuarial 
risk assessment discussed in Part II.   
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Mass incarceration has wreaked havoc in the United 
States, leaving many states with budget deficits and over-
crowded prisons.1  Now, as demands for reform to eliminate 
institutional racism within our criminal justice system 
increase, the wide disparity in treatment between minority 
and non-minority individuals in the criminal justice system 
cannot continue to be ignored by lawmakers.2  Current 
practices are unsustainable, and as a result, states are 
searching for ways to reduce the prison population and the 
disparate treatment of defendants without sacrificing public 
safety.  Enter evidence-based sentencing, which uses 
actuarial risk assessment tools during the sentencing phase 
to predict the sentence based on a defendant’s risk of 
recidivism.  Actuarial risk assessment tools use statistics to 
determine a defendant’s risk of recidivism based on varying 
characteristics such as age, gender, and criminal history.  
Proponents say evidence-based sentencing will help aid 
 
1 See Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, 
Inequality, and the Future of Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 
857–66 (2009); Robert J. Sampson & Charles Loeffler, Punishment’s Place: 
The Local Concentration of Mass Incarceration, 139 DAEDALUS 20 (2010).   
2 Jacqueline Johnson, Mass Incarceration: A Contemporary 
Mechanism of Racialization in the United States, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 301 
(2012).  
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judicial decision-making, reduce costs, and help reduce prison 
populations.3  
 
Risk assessment tools are not new; they have been 
utilized in different areas of the criminal justice system since 
their inception in the early 20th century, with actuarial risk 
assessment cropping up in the late 1970s.4  Currently, roughly 
twenty states use some form of actuarial risk assessment in 
areas such as pretrial detention, bail setting, and probation or 
parole.5  Most states, however, have resisted using risk 
assessment tools during sentencing.  Nevertheless, with the 
current trend of budget shortages and lack of space in prisons, 
states are increasingly considering evidence-based sentencing 
as a practical option.  Indeed, influential legal institutions, 
such as the American Law Institute and the National Center 
for State Courts, have endorsed the use of these tools.6  The 
American Law Institute’s draft revisions to the Model Penal 
Code (“MPC”) would require actuarial risk assessment tools to 
be used in sentencing, which creates an important moment to 
examine these tools and how they will be used.7 
 
 This Note will focus specifically on Pennsylvania’s 
exploration of evidence-based sentencing, as it is currently the 
only state in the process of implementing a fully-automated8 
actuarial risk assessment tool for all defendants at 
sentencing.9  Part II will survey the various types of risk 
assessment tools used across the United States to track the 
 
3 Douglas A. Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality 
for Sentences, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 151, 158 (2014).  
4 Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled” 
Proposition, 30 JUST. Q. 270, 274 (2013).  
5 Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 
674 (2015).   
6 Id.  
7 Id.  
8 “Fully automated” means that there will be little to no 
involvement of clinical professionals in creating the risk score.  That is, the 
information will be entered into the computer, which will automatically 
assign a risk profile based on the input information.  
9 While Virginia has evidence-based sentencing, it is not fully 
automated, nor is it used across all defenders.  
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development of risk under the assessment protocol standards 
of the criminal justice system.  Part III will review the current 
criticisms on actuarial risk assessment.  Part IV will outline 
the proposed risk assessment tool Pennsylvania is currently 
developing.  Finally, Part V will weigh Pennsylvania’s model 
against the criticisms of actuarial risk assessment discussed 
in Part II.  Although Pennsylvania has taken steps to avoid 
problems typical of evidence-based sentencing, this Note 
argues that actuarial risk assessment tools have no place in 
sentencing, given their current unreliability and the systemic 
racial biases they entrench.  As a result, evidence-based 
sentencing is not the “new way forward” as many have 
suggested, and Pennsylvania should abandon its potential 
move to evidence-based sentencing.  
 
II. RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS 
 
There are currently more than sixty different risk 
assessment tools across the United States.10  These risk 
assessment tools vary widely in their approach and accuracy.  
In general, risk assessment tools are understood to be part of 
one of four different “generations” of risk assessment,11 which 
this section will briefly outline to provide context for 
understanding the type of tool Pennsylvania will implement.  
 
A. First-Generation Risk Assessment Tools 
 
 First-generation risk assessment tools, unlike all 
subsequent generations, do not utilize statistical data; 
instead, they are based on clinical evaluations.12  Until 
recently, the primary way criminal justice actors calculated a 
defendant’s likelihood of recidivism was through these clinical 
 
10 Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., The New Science of Sentencing: 
Should Prison Sentences be Based on Crimes That Haven’t Been Committed 
Yet?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2015, 7:15 A.M.), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-
sentencing#.abQZxa461 [https://perma.cc/2VF6-RNXD].  
11 JAMES BONTA & D.A. ANDREWS, RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY MODEL 
FOR OFFENDER ASSESSMENT AND REHABILITATION 3–4 (2007). 
12 Hannah-Moffat, supra note 4.  
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risk assessment tools.13  With a clinical model, mental health 
professionals evaluate an individual based on a wide range of 
criteria, analyzing factors such as family history, education, 
and criminal history.  These mental health professionals then 
make a judgment based on all the available information to 
determine the defendant’s risk of recidivism, and 
communicate their findings to the court.14  
 
First generation tools, or clinical risk assessment tools, 
are divided into either unstructured or structured 
assessments.15  Unstructured clinical assessments are general 
interviews with no preset criteria, whereas structured clinical 
assessments have standardized questions that are based on 
empirical research.16  Those who prefer clinical risk 
assessments value them for their focus on the individual, as 
each assessment is a comprehensive analysis of the defendant 
and her background.17  Although clinical risk assessment tools 
are still widely used, they have been criticized for a lack of 
accuracy and for high degrees of subjectivity, generally 
attributed to the wide variance of results depending on the 
individual conducting the assessment.18 
 
B. Second-Generation Risk Assessment Tools 
 
Second-generation risk assessment tools (the type 
Pennsylvania will implement) are actuarial.19  They use static 
factors (factors that cannot be changed by the defendant) 
linked to recidivism (e.g., a history of substance abuse), as well 
as other factors, in order to make statistical predictions about 
 
13 Id. at 271.  
14 BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 11, at 3. 
15 Patricia M. Harris, What Community Supervision Officers Need 
to Know About Actuarial Risk Assessment and Clinical Judgment, 70 FED. 
PROB. 8, 8 (2006).  
16 Id.  
17 Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific 
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 853 (2014).  
18 Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The Influence of Criminal 
History on Risk Assessments, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75, 92 (2015).  
19 BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 11.  
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the defendant’s likelihood of recidivism.20  The presence of a 
“risk factor,” in any category, such as being male, produces a 
score of one or more depending on the variable and 
instrument; its absence receives a score of zero.21  The points 
derived from the presence of these factors are added together 
to generate a percentage that is supposed to predict the 
chance of recidivism based on data previously gathered about 
other defendants with the same factors as the current 
defendant.22  The data used in actuarial risk assessment tools 
is created using different criminal databases and then tested 
to find relevant indicators of recidivism.23  One reason 
actuarial risk assessments are purported to be more reliable 
than clinical judgments is their uniformity in 
application⎯any individual conducting the assessment 
should get the same result.24  For example, if you are male, 
twenty years of age, with two prior arrests, you will receive 
the same risk assessment score as every other male who is 
twenty years of age and has two prior arrests, regardless of 
who conducts the assessment.  
 
Evidence has consistently shown that actuarial risk 
assessments perform better than unstructured clinical risk 
assessments in terms of accurately predicting recidivism, 
which seems to support the notion that the statistical method 
is better than the older interview type methods.25  This 
evidence has led many to decry clinical risk assessment tools, 
and move towards actuarial tools.26  But the accuracy benefits 
of second generation tools and beyond may only exist when 
comparing actuarial tools to unstructured clinical 
assessments.  Studies have found that the structured clinical 
 
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 Hannah-Moffat, supra note 4.  
23 Id.   
24 Sidhu, supra note 5, at 691; Michael Marcus, MPC—The Root of 
the Problem: Just Deserts and Risk Assessment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 751, 769 
(2009).  
25 Harris, supra note 15, at 9–10.  
26 Dawinder S. Sindhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 
674 (2015). 
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assessments can produce results as accurate or even more 
accurate than the second-generation actuarial tools, 
depending on the population being assessed and the tool being 
used.27  Overall, there is a slight edge in accuracy for actuarial 
prediction tools over structured clinical assessments due to 
their ease of use and uniformity in application.28  However, 
critics have also questioned the de-individualization of 
second-generation risk assessment tools.29  That is, unlike 
clinical risk assessment, second-generation risk assessment 
tools fail to account for the individual’s particular 
circumstances.  Instead, they view the individual narrowly 
under a set of basic characteristics and ignore nuances.  
 
C. Third- and Fourth-Generation Risk Assessment 
Tools 
 
These criticisms led to the development of third- and 
fourth-generation risk assessment tools, which combine 
successful clinical elements with actuarial tools to predict 
recidivism.30  Proponents of these tools claim that they are 
more effective than either method alone, because they utilize 
best practices from each of the two prior generations of tools 
to create a more individualized, yet still scientific, risk 
assessment tool.31  Significantly, these tools—dubbed “risk-
needs tools”—include dynamic risk factors that an individual 
can change over time and are focused on identifying 
criminogenic needs (traits that are linked to an individual’s 
likelihood of recidivism).32  These tools are predicated on the 
idea that criminal behavior is predictable and that the areas 
of risk that are likely to lead an individual to re-offend are 
traceable.33  Those who support the third-generation of risk-
 
27 Id.   
28 Id. at 10–11; Hannah-Moffat, supra note 4, at 276.  
29 Hannah-Moffat, supra note 4, at 276. 
30 Id. at 275–76.  
31 Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of 
Principles of Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and 
Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 603 (2009). 
32 Hannah-Moffat, supra note 4, at 276–80.  
33 Id. at 276. 
No. 3:150]          RISKY BUSINESS 157 
need assessment tools assert “third-generation risk-need 
instruments offer a way of monitoring the effectiveness, or 
ineffectiveness, of programs and supervision strategies,” 
which is a major drawback of second-generation tools.34  
 
 Fourth-generation risk assessment tools build upon 
third generation tools, as they are also risk-need tools, but 
they refine their assessments of risk to align more directly 
with treatment possibilities.35  Thus, not only do fourth-
generation tools identify areas of need, they also identify 
treatment target goals and assess progress of the offender 
moving forward.36  These tools, however, are relatively new 
and are not widely used.37  As such, these tools have not been 
tested as often as other generations of tools have, and their 
reliability remains in question.  
 
III. OVERVIEW OF CRITICISMS 
 
This section will explore the criticisms of actuarial risk 
assessment in more depth, and group them into five primary 
categories: 1) ethical concerns with punishing future conduct; 
2) static and dynamic factors; 3) statistical reliability; 4) 
judicial understanding; and 5) impact on incarceration.  
 
A. Ethical Concerns with Punishing Future Conduct 
 
One of the more overarching concerns with risk 
assessment tools being used during sentencing is the concern 
of punishing future conduct.38  Historically, the United States 
has followed a conception of justice that punishes defendants 
 
34 BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 11, at 4.  
35 Hannah-Moffat, supra note 4, at 279–84.   
36 BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 11, at 4–5.  
37 Id. 
38 Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform in Motion: The Promise and Perils 
of Incorporating Risk Assessments and Cost-Benefit Analysis into 
Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 707, 732 (2011); John Monahan, 
A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, 
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 393 (2006); Sidhu, supra note 5, 
at 686.   
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for the crimes they have committed⎯a theory of justice that 
focuses on just outcomes.39  The United States has emphasized 
liberty as one of the highest tenets of its society.  Indeed, the 
Declaration of Independence proclaims that the right to 
liberty is unalienable.40  In light of our emphasis on personal 
liberty, we afford a defendant guaranteed rights designed to 
protect liberty until there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he has committed a crime.41  Evidence-based sentencing, 
however, shifts the paradigm by attempting to predict the 
likelihood that a defendant will commit another crime and 
reenter the criminal justice system.  A system that gives 
longer sentences to defendants based on the outcome of a risk 
assessment tool is at direct odds with our fundamental values 
of liberty and innocence until proven guilty.  
 
Some advocates of actuarial risk assessment do not 
believe it punishes future conduct and therefore avoid 
confronting this problem.42  Michael Marcus, an Oregon state 
judge, holds this view, stating that, “Considering real 
disparity in risk does not mean that we are ‘punishing 
offenders for future crimes,’ but rather that we are managing 
the risk these offenders represent by fashioning a sentence in 
response to a present conviction for a past crime.”43  This 
position is untenable.  If a judge’s sentence is based on a 
statistical model which believes the defendant has a high-risk 
of committing a crime in the future, and the defendant is 
sentenced more harshly because of that high-risk designation, 
then the sentence length is only increased as a result of the 
prediction that the defendant will commit a crime in the 
future.  It is difficult to conceive how sentencing based on a 
“high” risk of recidivism could not punish the individual for 
future conduct when it is built precisely to consider future 
conduct in sentencing determinations.  
 
 
39 Marcus, supra note 24, at 751.   
40 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  
41 U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1, cl. 3.  
42 Marcus, supra note 24. 
43 Id. at 754. 
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Most proponents accept that risk assessment involves 
future-oriented sentencing; however, they do not view this 
sentencing form as problematic because judges, they argue, 
already implicitly use their own arbitrary assessment of a 
defendant’s risk during sentencing and may impose a longer 
sentence if they believe he will commit more crimes in the 
future.44  Actuarial tools, proponents claim, will only help to 
increase the accuracy of the judge’s predictions.45  The first 
problem with this reasoning is that utilizing evidence-based 
sentencing will likely only increase the role future-oriented 
risk assessment plays,46 perhaps overshadowing more 
traditional assessments of moral desert.  That is, even though 
most proponents say that the risk assessment tool will only be 
“one piece of the sentencing puzzle,” it is still likely to have a 
significant impact if judges rely on this model to make 
sentencing decisions.   
 
If judges do not rely on these tools, and they do not 
have a significant impact on judicial decision-making, then 
pouring limited resources into the creation of these tools will 
waste resources that could have been better used in other 
areas of criminal justice reform.  If judges do choose to rely on 
these tools and sentence an individual based on statistics, 
then this increases the emphasis on future-oriented 
sentencing, which is directly at odds with the notion of 
innocent until proven guilty and fundamental liberty.  It 
seems that the more likely of the two scenarios is that judges 
will rely on these risk assessment tools, especially elected 
judges who have their record scrutinized.  Actuarial risk 
assessment could help remove accountability⎯the judge can 
look towards a defendant’s risk score in the event of an 
incorrect decision to avoid any accompanying political 
backlash.  
 
44 Richard P. Kern & Mark H. Bergstrom, A View from the Field: 
Practitioners’ Response to Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled” Proposition, 
25 FED. SENT’G REP. 185, 185 (2013); David A. Soulé & Stacy S. Najaka, 
Paving a Path to Informed Sentencing Decisions, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 181, 
182 (2013). 
45 Sidhu, supra note 5, at 686.  
46 Sonja B. Starr, supra note 17 at 808.  
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B. Invidious Punishment Criteria and Distributive 
Concerns 
 
As demonstrated earlier, not all risk assessment tools 
are created equal.  Second-generation risk assessment tools 
only focus on static characteristics, such as age, gender, or 
criminal history. 47  A defendant cannot change these factors, 
meaning he cannot improve his risk score over time.  Third- 
and fourth-generation risk assessment tools include these 
static factors, but they also utilize dynamic factors, which can 
change over time, such as employment history or education.48  
While risk assessment tools have steered clear of explicitly 
using race as a factor because of the clear constitutional bar, 
they still consider other static immutable characteristics, 
which is directly at odds with current federal sentencing 
practices.49  As University of Virginia School of Law professor 
John Monahan notes:  
 
With the single exception of criminal history—
which the Guidelines state ‘is relevant in 
determining the appropriate sentence’—
virtually all of the variables that potentially 
could be used as scientifically valid risk factors 
for violence under a forward-looking 
consequentialist ‘crime control’ theory of 
punishment are explicitly excluded from 
consideration in federal sentencing 
procedures.50   
 
In other words, federal judges are prohibited by law under the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 198451 from considering any of the 
many factors, such as age and gender, which risk assessment 
tools explicitly use to forecast future risk.  
 
47 BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 11, at 3.   
48 Id.  
49 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, §§ 5H1.10, 
5H1.12, at 425 (NOV. 2004). 
50 Monahan, supra note 38, at 397–98 (emphasis added).  
51 Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). 
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One might not take issue with the inclusion of these 
factors.  If we know that males, for instance, commit more 
crimes than females do, using static factors such as gender 
could allow us to be “smart on crime.”  But it is unethical to 
sentence defendants using static characteristics that they can 
neither control nor change.  Not only are defendants 
potentially being sentenced more harshly for factors outside 
of their control, but also defendants would be unable to reduce 
their risk assessment score in the future.  For example, if a 
young, unemployed male sold narcotics once and received a 
risk score of fifty percent, and the next year enrolled in college 
courses and found meaningful employment, his risk 
assessment score would not change.  Since the time of his 
conviction, he has drastically changed his position in life, and 
it seems patently unfair to deny acknowledgement of the 
positive changes he has made.  Additionally, evidence bears 
the idea that work and education reduce recidivism; studies 
show that released prisoners who participate in transitional 
work programs have a recidivism reduction of eighteen 
percent.52  One study has found that formerly incarcerated 
individuals without some type of employment are three times 
more likely to recommit a crime.53 
 
Yet, second-generation tools do not account for this 
variance in any way.  Some scholars note that sentencing 
based on immutable static factors goes against fundamental 
notions of fairness.54  As University of New Mexico School of 
Law professor Dawinder Sidhu opined, by measuring risk in 
this way, “risk-assessment tools sever the link between 
punishment and individual conduct, and between punishment 
and individual control.”55  Our modern criminal justice system 
is built on punishing individuals based on their choices and 
 
52 Bruce Western, From Prison to Work: A Proposal for a National 
Prisoner Reentry Program, 2008 BROOKINGS INST. 1, 2–5.   
53 Steven D. Bell, Note, The Long Shadow: Decreasing Barriers to 
Employment, Housing, and Civic Participation for People with Criminal 
Records Will Improve Public Safety and Strengthen the Economy, 42 W. ST. 
L. REV. 1, 10 (2014).  
54 Id.  
55 Sidhu, supra note 5, at 675.  
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acts, and not on immutable characteristics.  Inability to 
improve a risk score is one reason why second-generation risk 
assessment tools are criticized more harshly than third- and 
fourth-generation risk assessment tools.  These later 
generations include dynamic factors and clinical assessment 
elements, meaning an individual’s risk score has the potential 
to improve over time.56   
 
However, the inclusion of dynamic factors introduces a 
new host of issues that make them problematic.  For example, 
unemployment is often considered a risk factor, and 
defendants without jobs will be given a higher risk score than 
those with jobs.57  While factoring in employment may seem 
beneficial, it will likely disproportionally affect people of color 
because minority unemployment rate is higher than the white 
unemployment rate,58 especially post-incarceration.  Dynamic 
tools also often factor in education levels, which is likely to 
negatively affect minority individuals at a disproportionate 
rate due to the disparate educational opportunities and 
graduation rates.59  This draws into question the fairness of 
assessing risk using dynamic factors; these factors could cause 
more sentencing errors because they do not account for the 
systemic racism that pervades our system.  A recent study 
done by ProPublica in Broward County, Florida confirms this 
idea.  
 
Broward County may begin using a private company, 
Northpointe, along with the 137-question dynamic risk 
assessment tool designed by Northpointe.60  However, an 
analysis of the tool’s efficacy found that black individuals were 
 
56 Hannah-Moffat, supra note 4, at 275.  
57 BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 11, at 4–5.  
58 Western, supra note 52, at 6. 




60 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-riskassessments-in-
criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/PY2R-SDMP]. 
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almost twice as likely as white individuals to be labeled a 
higher risk but not actually re-offend.61  It had the opposite 
effect among white individuals: white individuals were much 
more likely than black individuals to be labeled lower risk and 
recidivate.62  While no clear research has been done to 
examine the error rates between black and white defendants 
for static risk assessment tools, the factors used in static risk 
assessment tools are likely still subject to many of the same 
pitfalls because of the criteria they use. 
 
The utilization of criminal history, which is seen by 
many as the only valid criterion for actuarial risk 
assessment,63 is also problematic.  As one leading scholar put 
it, “prison populations are not random, they are the products 
of past sentencing policies and patterns and they 
disproportionately represent black people and other socially 
disadvantaged groups.”64  Indeed, a black man is more likely 
to be incarcerated than a white woman,65 and minority 
communities have considerably higher rates of police presence 
and surveillance than white communities do.66  Thus, those 
who commit crime are considerably more likely to be caught 
in neighborhoods with added police surveillance (largely 
minority communities) than they would in communities with 
lower police presence (largely white communities).67  
 
 
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Monahan, supra note 38, at 397–98.  
64 Hannah-Moffat, supra note 4, at 279–84.   
65 HEATHER C. WEST, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 21 
tbl.18 (2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8PAS-36RZ].   
66 Bernard E. Harcourt, A Reader’s Companion to Against 
Prediction: A Reply to Ariela Gross, Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir on 
Economic Modeling, Selective Incapacitation, Governmentality, and Race, 
33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 265 (2008). See also Sarah Childress, The Problem 
with “Broken Windows” Policing, FRONTLINE (June 28, 2016), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-problem-with-broken-
windows-policing/ [https://perma.cc/DCC6-WNVH].  
67 Id.  
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This concept is borne out especially concerning drug 
offenses.  Though white and black people use and sell drugs 
at roughly the same rate,68 black people are 3.6 times more 
likely to be arrested for selling drugs and 2.5 times more likely 
to be arrested for possessing them.69  Minorities who are 
arrested at higher rates are then more likely to serve longer 
sentences when sentenced in accordance with an actuarial 
risk assessment tool because they will be deemed a higher risk 
for having been arrested for more crimes.70   But this higher 
arrest rate for minorities exists, at least in part, because the 
police are paying more attention to them and their 
communities.71  The resulting effect is what some have termed 
a “ratchet” or a “feedback” effect.  Bernard Harcourt, a leading 
scholar on actuarial risk assessment in criminal justice, has 
argued that the feedback effect will:  
 
[H]ave significant detrimental consequences on 
the employment, educational, familial, and 
social outcomes of the profiled populations—
including, in the case of racial profiling, the 
devastating effects associated with the notion 
of [b]lack criminality that pervades the public 
imagination . . . The high costs associated with 
any ratchet effect should temper our embrace 
of the actuarial.72 
 
Compounding the issue that minority communities are more 
heavily policed, many risk instruments assign points multiple 
times for a single prior criminal event, particularly those that 
maintain numerous and overlapping criminal offending items 
 
68 Some studies have suggested that white people use and sell 
drugs at even higher rates than black people.  Jonathan Rothwell, How the 




69 Id.  
70 BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 11, at 3.  
71 Rothwell, supra note 68.  
72 Harcourt, supra note 66, at 271.    
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in their scoring sheets.73  This results in a double counting 
effect.  For example, if an individual has committed a juvenile 
drug crime, depending on the risk assessment tool, they could 
have the same event counted three times⎯once under prior 
offense, again for its nature as a drug crime, and a third time 
for it being a juvenile crime⎯corresponding to a much higher 
risk assessment score for a single crime. Sonia Starr summed 
it up well:  
 
Although we do not know whether EBS 
[evidence-based sentencing] will reduce 
incarceration on balance, the most intuitive 
expectation is that it will increase incarceration 
for some people (those deemed high risk) and 
reduce it for others (those deemed low risk).  If 
so, it will further demographically concentrate 
mass incarceration’s impact.74   
 
In other words, while the morality issue is still up for debate, 
even if it were morally acceptable to use these tools punishing 
future conduct, the data on which these tools rely is largely 
grounded in structural racism.  Using these types of tools will 
only perpetuate the structural racism that has plagued the 
criminal justice system.  
 
C. Statistical Reliability 
 
Not only is punishing defendants based on factors 
outside of their control problematic, it is also near impossible 
to treat individuals fairly if they are treated as monolithic 
groups, unshaped by the particular contexts of their 
background.  This is one of the biggest problems facing 
actuarial risk assessment tools: group statistics cannot 
adequately determine individual conduct.  From a moral 
standpoint, the courts have argued that each individual must 
be sentenced as such.  For instance, the Supreme Court’s case 
 
73 Hamilton, supra note 18, at 98.    
74 Starr, supra note 17, at 837.  
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law on indigent defendants has consistently held that 
disparate treatment cannot be justified based on statistical 
group generalizations.75  
 
These generalizations are not just morally 
questionable; they are also scientifically problematic.  That is, 
knowledge of group tendencies, even when precise, cannot 
accurately forecast individuals.76  Actuarial risk assessment 
tools identify risk levels based on a defendant’s membership 
in certain groups, and assign the same risk profile to every 
defendant who contains those same characteristics.  But we 
know that individuals vary widely⎯something for which 
actuarial risk assessments do not account.  One thirty-year-
old female with a criminal record can be viewed differently 
from a thirty-year-old female without a criminal record.  
Moreover, if sixty percent of males under twenty-one 
recidivated, this is inadequate evidence that a random 
twenty-one-year-old male will recidivate.  But second-
generation actuarial risk assessment tools do not consider 
these variances.  Quite opposite, one of the main supporting 
arguments for evidence-based sentencing is that it will reduce 
the variance of judicial decision-making.77  However, an 
overreliance on risk assessment encourages the judge to 
reduce the individual to a risk number, which values 
consistency over fairness and justice.   
 
All of the aforementioned helps to account for one of 
the most fundamental misconceptions about risk assessment: 
that risk assessment tools predict risk in some absolute sense.  
In reality, risk assessment tools cannot say, for example, that 
an individual is sixty percent likely to recidivate⎯they can 
only say that sixty percent of the people with those same 
group characteristics did recidivate.  Importantly, the tool 
 
75 Id. at 807.  
76 Timothy P. Cadigan & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, 
Implementing Risk Assessment in the Federal Pretrial Services System, 75 
FED. PROB. 30, 31 (2011); David J. Cooke & Christine Michie, Limitations of 
Diagnostic Precision and Predictive Utility in the Individual Case: A 
Challenge for Forensic Practice, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 259 (2010).   
77 Cadigan & Lowenkamp, supra note 72.   
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cannot distinguish between whether the defendant is in the 
sixty percent of people who did recidivate or the forty percent 
of people who did not.  As might be expected, this leads to high 
false positive rates (predicting that the defendant would 
recidivate when they did not) because the group statistics just 
cannot predict the future.78  Indeed, the commentary to the 
MPC revision on risk assessment finds similarly, stating that 
“error rates when projecting that a particular person will 
engage in serious criminality in the future are notoriously 
high” and that “most projections of future violence are wrong 
in significant numbers of cases.”79  
 
To better explain why actuarial risk assessment error 
rates are so high, Sonia Starr, a leading critic of actuarial risk 
assessment tools, provides an analysis of group to individual 
statistics.  Her analysis uses a sample of 400 women and their 
height averages.  She demonstrates how relatively easy it is 
to take the average height of this group of women, and then 
predict the average height of another group of women based 
off of the original sample⎯there is a high statistical likelihood 
that you would be correct in this scenario.80  She continues on 
to ask, if, instead of trying to ascertain the average height of 
another group of women, we wanted to simply guess the 
height of the next woman we encountered based on our 
sample.  She states: 
 
Your single best guess would be the female 
mean from your sample, which is 64.9 inches. 
But you wouldn’t be nearly as confident in that 
prediction as you would be in the prediction for 
the group mean. In fact, within the same 400-
person sample used above, only 13.5% of 
women have heights that are between 64.5 and 
 
78 Brian Netter, Using Group Statistics to Sentence Individual 
Criminals: An Ethical and Statistical Critique of the Virginia Risk 
Assessment Program, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 712 (2007).  
79 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09, at 56–57 (Tentative 
Draft No. 2, 2011).  
80 Starr, supra note 17, at 844.  
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65.3 inches, which was your 95% confidence 
interval for the group mean. If you wanted to 
give an individual forecast for that next woman 
that you could be 95% confident in, it would 
have to be much less precise; you could predict 
that she would be somewhere between 59.5 
inches and 70.3 inches . . . In other words, you 
don’t know much at all about how tall to expect 
the next woman to be.81 
 
Though recidivism is somewhat different because it is a 
bivariate statistic, which means there are only two options: 
the individual will recidivate or the individual will not 
recidivate.  Starr’s example is illustrative of how difficult it is 
to use group statistics for a particular characteristic to predict 
the occurrence of that characteristic in an individual.   
 
Many risk assessment models use the Area Under the 
Curve (“AUC”) to validate and determine the statistical 
significance of their tool⎯that is, to gauge the tool’s accuracy 
in predicting recidivism.  AUC pairs each person who ended 
up recidivating with a random person who did not; the score 
is the fraction of these pairs in which the recidivist was given 
a higher risk score.82  AUC is measured from zero to one.  A 
perfect model would receive a score of one, meaning it would 
always predict correctly.  In contrast, a coin flip would have 
an AUC of .5, signifying a fifty percent chance of either 
outcome occurring.83  The best published scores for risk 
assessment tools are around 0.75.84  Tools with this level of 
predictive capacity are generally the third and fourth-
generation models, which include dynamic risk factors, such 
as a psychological profile.85  “Many studies have reported AUC 
scores closer to 0.65.”86  Applying this model to height, 
 
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 846.  
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 846–47.   
85 Id. 
86 Starr, supra note 17, at 846.    
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Professor Starr notes that if height is changed into a binary 
model (tall or not tall), then height has an AUC score of 
0.825.87  This is despite the fact that the model was not very 
good at individual predictions.  This example demonstrates 
how even a high AUC does not necessarily mean that the 
predictive power of recidivism functions on an individual 
level.   
 
D. Judges Do Not Understand Risk Assessment 
 
Researchers who investigated how judges used risk 
information in decision-making found that judges know little 
about risk technologies and thus often use information that 
already fits their perception of risk.88  In a comprehensive 
study, researchers found that although court actors received 
training on risk assessment tools and their interpretation:  
 
[P]ractitioners tended to struggle with the 
meaning of the risk score and the importance of 
the items contained in the assessment tools . . . 
(Rather than understanding that an individual 
who obtains a high risk score shares 
characteristics of an aggregate group of high-
risk offenders, the individual is likely to become 
known as a high-risk offender.)89   
 
Unless actors within the criminal justice system are made 
fully aware of the drawbacks of the tools they are 
implementing, they have the potential to misuse them.  James 
Bonta, a staunch advocate for risk assessment, notes that:  
 
It is one thing for scientists to demonstrate that 
a risk instrument or a treatment program can 
work but it is a very different matter to make it 
 
87 Id. at 846–47.  
88 Hannah-Moffat, supra note 4, at 288.   
89 KELLY HANNAH-MOFFAT, THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PUNISHMENT 
AND SOCIETY: PUNISHMENT AND RISK 12 (Jonathan Simon & Richard Sparks 
eds., 2013).  
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work in correctional agencies with a diverse 
work force in terms of education, values and 
experience, conflicting criminal justice policies 
and management practices that are not 
conducive to selecting and training of staff in 
effective assessment techniques.90  
 
The effectiveness and fairness of these tools relies in large 
part on how the actors within the criminal justice system 
choose to utilize them.  If the same tool is used differently 
across different jurisdictions and even across different judges, 
the claim that these tools decrease subjectivity holds 
considerably less weight.  Furthermore, because there are 
already fairness and accuracy concerns with the tools 
themselves, adding human error will likely decrease the 
efficacy of these tools. 
 
E. Crime Rates and Elasticity to Incarceration 
 
In addition to punishing individuals for crimes they 
have not yet committed, actuarial tools also have high false 
positive rates that rely on data skewed against racial 
minorities.  Risk assessment tools are supposed to reduce 
incarceration rates and prevent more crime.  However, as 
demonstrated, the tools can only say whom has the highest 
risk of recidivism based on other defendants with the same 
characteristics who have recidivated.  This is not reliable.  
This does not divulge the most important information 
necessary to prevent crime and reduce recidivism: the 
elasticity to incarceration or the extent at which incarceration 
reduces crime.  Without this information, risk assessment 
tools cannot adequately serve the public safety component 
that they purport to serve.  That is, if it is unclear whether 
incarcerating certain groups of individuals for longer will 
actually reduce their recidivism rates, then we have no basis 
for incarcerating individuals for longer just because they are 
deemed “higher risk.”  In fact, studies almost unequivocally 
 
90  BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 11, at 15.   
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show that a longer sentence does not decrease offender 
recidivism.91  
 
One commonly advanced line of reasoning in support 
of longer sentences is that individuals in prison can no longer 
commit new crimes.  This logic is flawed.  As one University 
of Houston Law Center professor notes, there is insufficient 
confirmatory data that increasing sentence length or using 
imprisonment to deter and incapacitate offenders predicted to 
be high-risk are effective at reducing recidivism or crime 
rates.92  In fact, studies have shown that when they are 
released, inmates are more likely to commit future crimes 
than those not incarcerated are or than those individuals 
incarcerated for shorter periods.93  Advocates for risk 
assessment tools ignore an overarching point: a longer 
sentence for individuals may increase the chances of 
recidivism in some individuals.   
 
Failing to study the elasticity to incarceration is likely 
to have detrimental effects on communities of color.  These 
tools have not been adequately developed or tested for 
minority populations.94  Much of the science has been based 
on white offender populations.  As a result, there has been “a 
lack of attention to the racialized nature of offending and 
imprisoned populations and to the specific needs of nonwhite 
[sic] offenders.”95  Therefore, not only does actuarial risk 
assessment lack information on elasticity to incarceration 
limit its effectiveness, it especially lacks data regarding the 
effect these tools will have on minority populations. 
 
Increasing sentence length will only perpetuate the 
current cycle of racial injustice.  Studies have shown that, 
because high incarceration rates disproportionally affect 
 
91 Warren, supra note 31, at 594.  
92 Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS 
L.J. 423, 434 (2013).  
93 Warren, supra note 31, at 594. 
94 Hannah-Moffat, supra note 4, at 279–84. 
95 Id. at 280. 
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minority communities, “those communities are harmed when 
prisoners are incarcerated and when they return with 
diminished political, economic, and social status.”96  
Incarceration has an “enormously harmful effect on the life 
prospects of those imprisoned.  Released prisoners suffer a 
thirty to forty percent loss of income, their domestic 
partnerships are often ruptured, and their marriage, job, and 
housing prospects reduced.”97  Minority populations 
experience these effects more keenly.  For example, post-
release, sixty percent of black individuals suffered 
consequences in the job search as opposed to only thirty 
percent of white individuals.  In other words, a criminal 
history is considerably more damaging to black individuals.  
When combined with the statistics on the reduction of 
recidivism in those defendants who have secured 
employment, racial minorities face disparate impact.  These 
factors contribute directly to the likelihood of recidivism.  Yet 
evidence-based sentencing fails to account for this basic 
premise of the detriment to people of color. 
 
IV. PENNSYLVANIA’S MODEL OF RISK ASSESSMENT IN 
SENTENCING 
 
In November 2015, Pennsylvania had approximately 
50,000 people in state custody⎯about 2,000 more individuals 
than for which it has permanent beds.98  To accommodate this 
overflow, Pennsylvania has increased the percentage of its 
budget devoted to incarceration.99  Thirty years ago, 
Pennsylvania spent less than two percent of its total budget 
on incarceration⎯it now spends more than seven percent, or 
two billion USD, each year on its corrections system.100  
Unsurprisingly, greater incarceration rates has not “fixed” 
these individuals; between twenty and twenty-nine percent of 
 
96 Traum, supra note 92, at 434.  
97 Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission Ought to be 
Doing: Reducing Mass Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 309 (2013).  
98 Barry-Jester et al., supra note 10.   
99 Id.  
100 Id.   
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individuals return to jail within one-year of release.101  Thus, 
Pennsylvania is spending a significant portion of its budget on 
a program that has yet to address the severe problems it faces.  
As a result, the Pennsylvania legislature has been looking for 
ways to reduce the incarceration rate, as well as the amount 
spent on incarceration.  In 2010, the legislature and governor 
passed Act 95, which mandated that the Pennsylvania 
Commission on Sentencing develop a risk assessment tool to 
assist judges at the sentencing phase.102  Specifically, 
according to the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing 
report, Act 95 mandated that the Commission undertake the 
following: 
 
• Adopt a risk assessment instrument to be used at 
sentencing; 
• Consider the risk of re-offense and threat to public 
safety; 
• Help determine if offender is a candidate for 
alternative sentencing programs [CIP, SIP, 
Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive Program, 
Department of Correction’s Boot Camp]; and 
• Develop an empirically based worksheet using 
factors predicting recidivism.103 
In response to Act 95 of 2010, the Commission has 
undertaken a “Risk Assessment Project,” which is aimed at 
developing a fully automatic second-generation risk 
assessment tool for all defendants at the sentencing 
phase.104  Phase I of the project, which was conducted between 
 
101 NICOLETTE BELL ET AL., PA. DEP’T OF CORR., RECIDIVISM REPORT 
2013, 11 (2013), http://www.nationalcia.org/wp-content/uploads/2013-PA-
DOC-Recidivism-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8ZZ-RFFU].   
102 PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT, 
PHASE II INTERIM REPORT 1: DEVELOPMENT OF A RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE BY 
OFFENSE GRAVITY SCORE FOR ALL OFFENDERS 
(2015), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/research-and-
evaluation-reports/risk-assessment/phase-ii-reports/Interim-Rpt-1-Phase-
2/view [https://perma.cc/5VMX-VUJM] [hereinafter “INTERIM REPORT 1”].  
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 1. 
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2010–2014, studied different types of risk assessment tools 
and resulted in the development and validation of an initial 
risk assessment tool for defendants sentenced under levels 
three and four of the sentencing guidelines.105  After analyzing 
the results, the Commission decided on eight factors that 
correlated with recidivism: age; gender; location; total number 
of prior arrests; prior property arrests; prior drug arrests; 
property offender; and Offense Gravity Score (“OGS”), which 
has fourteen levels that correspond to the seriousness of the 
crime.106 
 
Phase II of the project is currently ongoing.107  For 
Phase II, the Commission has expanded the scope of its risk 
assessment tool and developed a scale for defendants 
sentenced under all five levels of the guidelines.  The 
Commission is in the process of validating the expanded 
Phase II tool.108  For this phase, the Commission used the total 
sample of offenders from 1998–2000, consisting of 112,702 
offenders, to generate its data on recidivism rates and 
factors.109  This sample was then split at random into two sub-
samples: one for the development sample and the other for the 
validation sample.110  The Commission used another sample 
of offenders from 2004–2006 as a second validation sample.111  
The final development sample had 51,131 defendants after 
some cases were removed for missing data.112  
 
The Phase II tool, in addition to covering all five levels 
of the guideline, also built a scale for each different OGS, 
 
105 Id.  
106 PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT, 
INTERIM REPORT 7: VALIDATION OF RISK SCALE (2013), 
http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/research-and-evaluation-
reports/risk-assessment/phase-i-reports/interim-report-7-validation-of-
risk-scale/view [https://perma.cc/G4MN-ZCSL] [hereinafter “INTERIM 
REPORT 7”].  
107 INTERIM REPORT 1, supra note 102, at 3. 
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109 Id. at 3–4. 
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No. 3:150]          RISKY BUSINESS 175 
which tracks the seriousness of the crime.113  For example, 
criminal mischief with damage under $500 has an OGS of one, 
while murder of a law enforcement official has an OGS of 
fifteen.114  This was a change from the Phase I tool, which had 
one tool for OGS’s different levels and used the OGS level as 
a factor in the risk assessment scale.115    
 
The Commission chose a set of nine factors for Phase 
II, four of which (age, gender, county, and number of prior 
arrests) were a part of the Phase I study.116  The nine factors 
are: age; gender; county; current offense type; multiple 
current convictions; number of prior arrests; prior offense 
type; prior record score; and prior juvenile adjudication.117  
The factors that were dropped or modified for Phase II were 
prior property arrests, prior drug arrests, property offender, 
and OGS.  In Phase II, the Commission combined prior 
property arrests and prior drug arrests into prior offense type, 
changed property offender to type of current offense, and 
dropped OGS as a factor in favor of having a differing scale for 
each OGS as explained above.118  
 
According to the Commission’s website, Phase III will 
include an expansion of the study to determine the impact of 
the inclusion of more dynamic factors, such as drug use, 
employment status, and education, on the risk of recidivism 
and the validity of the tool.119  However, Carol Zeiss, the 
Commission’s Director of Research, stated that Phase III may 
not occur given the difficulty in obtaining data.120  She 
 
113 Id. at 7.  
114 PA. CODE § 303.15 (2015). 
115 INTERIM REPORT 1, supra note 102, at 7. 
116 Id. at 1.  
117 Id.  However, the Commission made the decision to remove 
county as a factor from subsequent tools.  
118 Id. at 6.  
119 Risk Assessment Project, PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, 
http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/research-and-evaluation-
reports/risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/4PHU-TG2V].  
120 Telephone Interview with Carol Zeiss, Manager of Data, Pa. 
Sentencing Comm’n (Nov. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Interview with Carol 
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explained that for most cases, data simply was not available, 
and a reliable tool could not be developed using the small 
sample of defendants for whom information was available.121  
Ms. Zeiss said that if the Commission were to incorporate 
dynamic factors into their risk assessment tool, it would take 
place years down the road, after the successful 
implementation of the Phase II risk assessment tool in the 
field.122  In fact, she stated that before adding dynamic factors 
would be reconsidered, it is likely that the Commission will 
focus on creating a separate tool for sex offenders and violent 
crime.123  
 
V. CRITICISM OF PENNSYLVANIA’S SYSTEM 
 
A. Ethical Concerns with Punishing Future Conduct 
 
Pennsylvania is not be the first state to implement an 
actuarial risk assessment tool at sentencing; Virginia has 
used an actuarial risk assessment tool in sentencing for more 
than a decade.124  Nevertheless, there are important 
differences between the Pennsylvania and Virginia risk 
assessment models that necessitate examining 
Pennsylvania’s tool more closely.  Pennsylvania will be the 
first state to utilize a risk assessment tool for all defendants, 
whereas Virginia’s risk assessment tool only focuses on low-
risk offenders.125  The Virginia risk assessment model requires 
that twenty-five percent of all low-risk offenders be diverted 
 
Zeiss].  Ms. Zeiss’s statements are subject to change, pending additional 




124 BRIAN J. STROM ET AL., VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, 
OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREE-STAGE EVALUATION 1, 9 
(2002), http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/risk_off_rpt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/377P-T2ER] 
125 BRIAN J. STROM ET AL., VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, 
OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREE-STAGE EVALUATION 5 
(2002), http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/risk_off_rpt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z6HH-LN37]. 
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into alternative incarceration programs, while Pennsylvania’s 
model has no such mandate.126  If Pennsylvania uses actuarial 
risk assessment tools to increase sentence length, as its model 
suggests, then the state is incarcerating its citizenry for longer 
based on the potential that they will commit future crimes 
using a statistical model that is not always accurate.  This 
issue is minimized when risk assessment tools are used only 
to divert individuals from prison, as in Virginia, but it is a very 
real ethical problem that the Pennsylvania system faces.  
 
Pennsylvania’s utilization of actuarial risk assessment 
tools is problematic.  Many advocates for evidence-based 
sentencing suggest that actuarial risk assessment tools 
should only be used to mitigate sentences, as they understand 
that risk assessment tools are challenging for a number of 
reasons.127  Even the commentary to the MPC revision asserts 
that “section 6B.09 takes an attitude of skepticism and 
restraint concerning the use of high-risk predictions as a basis 
of elongated prison terms, while advocating the use of low-risk 
predictions as grounds for diverting otherwise prison-bound 
offenders to less onerous penalties.”128  
 
B. Invidious Punishment Criteria and Distributive 
Concerns 
 
As previously stated, the Pennsylvania risk 
assessment tool is a second-generation tool, meaning it judges 
individuals on a variety of static characteristics, such as age, 
gender, and prior criminal history.  Choosing a second-
generation risk assessment as opposed to a third- or fourth-
generation risk assessment tool limits the tool’s utility.  
Second-generation tools are criticized for assessing 
 
126 Id.  
127 RICHARD COUZENS, EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES: REDUCING 
RECIDIVISM TO INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY: A COOPERATIVE EFFORT BY COURTS 
AND PROBATION 10 (2011), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/EVIDENCE-
BASED-PRACTICES-Summary-6-27-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR2T-
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defendants based on immutable characteristics.  The 
Commission responded to criticisms of unfairness by issuing 
a special report “to examine, from a research perspective, the 
impact of” including static factors such as age, gender, and 
location in the tool.129  This study tested the validity of the tool 
without each factor, and concluded that including each factor 
increased the reliability of the tool.  Therefore, they asserted 
that these factors would remain in subsequent versions of the 
tool.  However, Carol Zeiss, the Commission’s Director of 
Research, states that the Commission dropped location as a 
factor as they move forward with testing and validation of the 
tool due to its racial implications.130  However, the 
Commission will continue to utilize age and gender.  As a 
result, young males will have considerably higher risk 
assessment scores, which will likely impact young men of color 
on an even greater scale. 
 
The Pennsylvania model will suffer from the 
“feedback” effect where defendants are caught in a cycle that 
increasingly punishes them for factors outside of their control.  
Minority defendants will be more likely to have a higher risk 
factor because their neighborhoods tend to be more heavily 
policed, and they are therefore more likely to have a prior 
criminal record.131  Even more problematic, however, is that a 
single crime could result in several different points towards 
the risk assessment score, drastically increasing the risk the 
tool calculates⎯a double-dipping effect.  For example, 
Pennsylvania’s tool counts not only the defendant’s number of 
prior arrests, but also prior offense type, prior record score and 
prior juvenile adjudication, each of which will punish the 
offender for their criminal history.132  This means that 
 
129 PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROJECT, 
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Pennsylvania’s tool will be particularly susceptible to an effect 
where one juvenile drug offense would count as a risk factor 
under prior arrests, prior offense type, prior record score and 
prior juvenile adjudication, which results in four or more 
additional points for the exact same crime. 
  
This system disproportionately impacts people of color 
in each factor.  For example, when considering prior juvenile 
adjudication, it is necessary to recognize that black 
individuals are disproportionately more likely to be arrested 
as juveniles.  “In 2010, African Americans comprised 
seventeen percent of all juveniles, but thirty-one percent of all 
arrests.”133  Therefore, black defendants are more likely to 
have an increased risk score in the juvenile category than 
white defendants.  The prior offense type is also likely to 
disproportionately affect people of color, as the only two types 
of prior offenses that count as a risk factor under 
Pennsylvania’s model are drug and property crimes.  As 
previously stated, black individuals are far more likely than 
white individuals to be arrested and convicted for drug crimes 
despite using and selling at the same rate.   
 
Under the Pennsylvania model, in five out of nine OGS 
levels, a defendant will get a one-point increase in their score 
if they have a prior drug crime.134  “Number of prior arrests” 
will also disproportionately affect communities of color, 
because, as discussed, these communities have higher rates of 
police presence and are therefore more likely to be arrested 
for the same crimes than those in communities with a lower 
police presence.  The statistics on drug crimes provide an 
illustrative example.  The National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) reports that 
nationally, black individuals represent twelve percent of the 
 
133 Disproportionate Minority Contact in the Juvenile Justice 
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total population of drug users, but thirty-eight percent of 
those arrested for drug offenses.135  In Philadelphia, the 
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) found that black 
individuals represent eighty-two136 percent of those arrested 
for marijuana possession, despite only constituting a small 
fraction of the total population.137  These statistics illuminates 
how the tool treats race differently, with the majority of the 
double-dipping disparity affecting black defendants.  
 
In an interim report, the Pennsylvania Commission on 
Sentencing questioned: “is it appropriate to consider factors 
that are closely linked to those already considered by the 
guidelines? . . . The issue for utilizing prior arrests is primarily 
whether counting both prior arrests and prior convictions 
would be considered [‘double-dipping’] and potentially 
punishing an offender twice for the same conduct (i.e., a prior 
arrest and prior conviction for the same crime).”138  
Nonetheless, there is no readily available evidence that the 
Commission has further considered, much less resolved, the 
issue of double-dipping.  
 
In general, responses to the criticism that actuarial 
risk assessment tools condemn individuals based on group 
characteristics that they cannot change have been quite 
unsatisfactory.  Mark Bergstrom, the Director of the 
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, states that “this is 
also true of risk assessments as practiced in the field of 
medicine, yet the treatment regimens guided by such 
 
135 Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, 
http://www.naacp.org/pages/criminal-justice-fact-sheet 
[https://perma.cc/6U3A-2QD6]. 
136 The War on Marijuana in Black and White, ACLU, 106 (Jun. 
2013), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/708721/aclu.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3ZQN-RL8J]. 
137 Id. at 17–20.  
138 PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, FACTORS THAT PREDICT RECIDIVISM 
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individual comparison with an aggregate group lead to 
treatment regimens that result in better overall patient 
outcomes than if such information were ignored.”139   
 
This is an unpalatable comparison.  First, actuarial 
risk assessment tools in the medical field have a considerably 
higher accuracy rate.  Generally, these actuarial risk 
assessment tools must have an AUC above a .8 to be 
considered even useful, and above a .9 to be considered truly 
reliable.140  For comparison, the AUC for Pennsylvania’s tool 
was between .66-.71, which rates between the “poor” category 
of predictive value and just barely into the “fair” category for 
one scale with a .71 AUC.141  Much more importantly, in the 
medical field, individuals are not punished for sharing 
characteristics with the larger group with which they are 
compared, nor are they punished for their inability to change 
their characteristics.  At best, Mr. Bergstrom’s response goes 
to the accuracy of these tools and is silent on the ethics of 
fairness.  While the medical field may use static 
characteristics to treat patients, it is tenuous to assert that it 
is also acceptable for the criminal justice system to use such 
characteristics to incarcerate certain individuals for longer 
periods. 
 
C. Statistical Reliability 
 
As discussed above, Pennsylvania has worked on 
developing a risk scale for each OGS.  The AUC of 
Pennsylvania’s tool varies depending on which OGS scale 
being looked at, which ranges from .66 to .73.142  The first OGS 
level has an AUC of .66, which falls in line with the studies 
that show that many actuarial risk assessment tools have an 
 
139 Kern & Bergstrom, supra note 44, at 187.   
140 Thomas G. Tape, The Area Under an ROC Curve, UNIV. NEB. 
MED. CTR., http://gim.unmc.edu/dxtests/roc3.htm [https://perma.cc/2S8P-
2CBZ]. 
141 Id. 
142 SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 129, at 20–29. 
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AUC around .65.143  Flipping a coin has an AUC of .5, which 
shows that for many of the OGS levels, the statistical 
reliability is not that much greater than a completely random 
selection.  On the other end, OGS level eight has an AUC of 
.73, which seems to indicate it is at least decently reliable, but 
this is only for one category of offenses.  Yet even a high AUC 
does not necessarily mean the tool is reliable, because again, 
even aside from the concerns of fairness, error rates matter.  
Error rates are very instructive as to how good the predictive 
power is on the individual scale.  The higher the error rate, 
the lower the predictive power of the tool for individuals.  For 
example, Pennsylvania reported an error rate of sixteen 
people wrongly predicted to recidivate (false positive) for every 
one person falsely predicted not to recidivate (false negative) 
in its first validation sample findings.144  It is concerning that 
the false positive rate is considerably higher than the false 
negative rate.  This suggests that the Commission made an 
implicit value judgment that it was better to falsely 
incarcerate more individuals than it was to incarcerate fewer.  
 
Pennsylvania studied the false positive/negative rate 
when determining a low-risk and high-risk cutoff point, as the 
cutoff point directly relates to the error rate.  For example, 
Pennsylvania’s risk assessment tool is scaled from zero to 
fourteen, so if the cutoff rate for low risk was between zero 
and ten, there would likely be an over prediction of low-risk 
individuals as opposed to if the cutoff rate was between zero 
and three.  In the seventh report of the validation study, the 
cutoff rate for low-risk was between zero and four points and 
high-risk was between five and fourteen, which means that if 
a defendant scored four or fewer risk points they would be 
designated low-risk, and above four, high-risk.145  With these 
cutoffs, the false positive rate was around forty-four 
percent.146  This is an incredibly high error rate.  The 
Commission deemed it is a better policy “to err on the side of 
 
143 Starr, supra note 17, at 846.  
144 INTERIM REPORT 7, supra note 106, at 1.  
145 Id. at 24.   
146 Id.  
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over-predicting recidivism [which results in more offenders 
incorrectly predicted to recidivate] than to err on the side of 
under-predicting recidivism [which results in more offenders 
incorrectly predicted to not recidivate].”147 
 
In an earlier development report, the Committee 
decided to test a risk assessment tool that divided defendants 
into low- (zero to four), medium- (five to ten), and high-risk 
(eleven to fourteen), instead of just high- and low-risk.148  With 
three categories of risk, the error rate was much lower, as it 
hovered around fifteen percent, depending on the sample.149  
It is confusing, to say the least, why the later validation 
sample would only include high-risk and low-risk samples 
when the earlier report showed a considerably lower false 
positive rate when the tool included the medium-risk 
category.  
 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to say why the 
Commission would choose the two-category risk division 
instead of the three-category tool.  One explanation might be 
that the percent accuracy for truly high-risk individuals was 
higher in the two-category risk assessment.  More specifically, 
in the three-category risk study, the percentage of defendants 
who were accurately assessed to be high-risk was around 
seventy-six percent.150  Eighty-six percent of those defendants 
who were actually high-risk (i.e., they recidivated within a 
three-year period) were correctly forecasted.151  In contrast, 
for the high- and low-risk validation study, while only fifty-six 
percent of individuals who were predicted to be high-risk 
actually were, of those who were actually high risk, ninety-
 
147 Id. at 19. 
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[hereinafter “INTERIM REPORT 5”]. 
149 Id. at 12. 
150 Id. at 11. 
151 Id. 
184 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 7:1 
five percent of them were predicted to be high-risk.152  This 
suggests that the Commission made a value judgment to focus 
on getting and keeping truly high-risk individuals behind bars 
rather than with ensuring that only those who are actually 
high-risk are designated high risk (i.e., a lower false positive 
rate).  While it is unclear whether this assessment is correct, 
this assessment does fall in line with the Commission’s 
determination that it would rather over-predict than under-
predict.  Regardless, an error rate of forty-three percent 
falsely predicted to recidivate seems untenable.  Such a high 
error rate should have deterred the Commission from moving 
forward with the binary risk category model.  Leading 
statisticians are skeptical whether an error rate above thirty 
percent could ever be defensible.153  However, even if it was 
assumed that the Commission will use the high-, medium-, 
and low-risk model, an error rate of twenty-seven percent is 
still quite high.  
 
In addition, there is much to be concerned about in 
regards to a potential error rate of around thirty percent, or 
at the worse end, around forty-five percent (depending on 
whether the Commission uses a high-, medium-, and low-risk 
model or simply high- and low-risk.  If the Commission has 
decided that over-prediction is better than under-prediction, 
it will lead to more individuals being incarcerated for longer 
than they otherwise would have been with a different 
predictive model, and they will be incarcerated based on a 
faulty tool that cannot predict for them individually.  If 
Pennsylvania wants to reduce incarceration rates, 
implementing a tool that not only has a high false positive 
rate, but also drastically favors false positives over false 
negatives, will not achieve that goal.  The problem with false 
positive rates can be summed up by a quote from William 
Blackstone that “it is better that ten guilty persons escape, 
than that one innocent suffer.”154  The false positive rate is 
 
152 Id.  
153 Netter, supra note 78, at 712.  
154 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND: 1765-1769 (9th ed. 1966). 
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even more troubling when considering future punishment, 
because, as one scholar puts it, “offenders incorrectly 
predicted to commit crimes in the future would be exposed to 
criminal liabilities that are doubly undeserved: once because 
they were based on predictions rather than past deeds, and 
twice because the predictions were inaccurate.”155   
 
Pennsylvania has not published any studies on the 
error rates of these tools for communities of color.156  Such 
research is crucial to understanding how these tools impact 
minority individuals, and to ensuring that these tools treat 
racial groups equally.  One might expect that, because of the 
issues with double-dipping criminal history and with the 
development of the tool based primarily on white 
criminology,157 actuarial risk assessment will 
disproportionately affect people of color.  If this is the case, 
error rates are likely to be greater for minority defendants as 
the tool will have rated them as higher risk than they actually 
are.  Therefore, it is critical to a fair system to ensure that the 
error rates do not increase with a minority defendant as 
opposed to with a white one.  
 
D. Judges Do Not Understand Risk Assessment 
 
To Pennsylvania’s credit, the Commission tested the 
statistical understanding of the criminal justice actors who 
would use the risk assessment tool.  Interestingly, the 
Commission found “significant differences” among the 
numeracy levels (understanding of numbers) of the actors 
within different counties, with some counties having 
considerably higher numeracy levels than others.158  
 
155 Netter, supra note 78, at 712 (emphasis added).    
156 Risk Assessment Project, supra note 119.  
157 Hannah-Moffat, supra note 4, at 280–82.  
158 PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, COMMUNICATING RISKS AT 
SENTENCING, INTERIM REPORT 8, at 1 (2014), 
http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/research-and-evaluation-
reports/risk-assessment/phase-i-reports/interim-report-8-communicating-
risk-at-sentencing/view [https://perma.cc/MGT3-S5UP] [hereafter “INTERIM 
REPORT 8”]. 
186 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 7:1 
Numeracy levels were measured by testing the degree to 
which the individuals felt comfortable with numerical 
information, using a nine-question survey about statistics.159 
 
Even more intriguing is that the counties measuring 
the lowest numeracy tended to show a different pattern of risk 
assessment than the other counties.  In some cases, the lowest 
numeracy county went in the opposite direction recommended 
by the tool from the higher numeracy counties.160  When the 
risk assessment tool designated the offender as high- or low-
risk, the low numeracy counties chose the opposite 
designation, which does not bode well for one of the supposed 
benefits of risk assessment in decreasing variance in judicial 
decision-making.  The Commission did not indicate which 
counties had lower numeracy levels.  
 
All users received full information regarding the risk 
assessment tool during at least one point in the study, and 
despite this information, there was still a variance in 
understanding among county actors.161  If the lower numeracy 
counties demonstrated a lower understanding of the risk 
assessment tools (as evidenced by choosing the opposite of the 
higher numeracy counties), there is a concern that defendants 
who reside in the lower numeracy counties will be 
disadvantaged in relation to their counterparts in higher 
numeracy counties.  If Pennsylvania is going to implement a 
risk assessment tool, the Commission should take steps to 
equalize the numeracy level of all actors who will be using the 
tool.  Clearly, this numeracy training cannot simply be limited 
to providing full information about the risk assessment tool, 
as participants in this study had such information.  
Unsurprisingly, across the board, high numeracy individuals 
were significantly more likely to report that the information 
was easy to understand than low numeracy individuals.162 
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Providing risk score information only had a modest 
effect on actors’ assessment of an offender’s recidivism risk.  
The study found that the risk assessment tool significantly 
affected risk judgments “in four of the six cases, but only ten 
percent of all decisions and, overall, the decisions of only forty-
four percent of the sample.”163  The Commission hypothesized 
reasons why this might be, considering that if the participants 
knew the study was a simulation they may not have taken the 
study as seriously as they would in sentencing real cases.  
Additionally, based on their numeracy studies, they claimed, 
“it is possible that the participants did not understand the risk 
information and therefore were not influenced by it.”164  They 
concluded that “this possibility is unlikely, however, in that 
the average movement was in the direction toward the 
actuarial information.”165  This explanation is nonsensical 
when paired with the Commission’s studies on numeracy.  The 
Commission noted that the lowest numeracy counties 
assessed risk in the opposite direction of the high numeracy 
counties.  Even though the average score moved in the 
direction of the risk assessment, it does not mean that the 
actors necessarily understood the risk assessment 
information.  
 
If the reason is that judges did not take the tool as 
seriously as they might in a real situation, the Commission 
should be concerned about the overreliance on this risk 
assessment tool.  The Director of the Commission specifically 
stated that the tool should only be one instrument in an array 
of sentencing information.166  However, there is the possibility 
that elected judges are more likely to be persuaded to rely on 
the risk assessment tool for political protection, as they can 
cite to the risk assessment tool as the scientific basis for their 
decisions.167  Most of the judges in Pennsylvania are elected 
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and not appointed,168 which increases the chances of this 
scenario.  One prominent University of Wisconsin Law School 
professor, Cecelia Klingele, shares this concern.  Ms. Klingele 
states that “unless criminal justice system actors are made 
fully aware of the limits of the tools they are being asked to 
implement, they are likely to misuse them.”169 
 
E. Crime Rates and Elasticity to Incarceration 
 
If Pennsylvania is going to increase sentences based on 
group averages to reduce crime, then it is necessary to analyze 
how incarcerating its members reduces crime.  This is an 
important question left unaddressed by second-generation 
risk assessment tools.  As Sonia Starr puts it, “[t]here is no 
particular reason to believe that groups that recidivate at 
higher rates are also more responsive to incarceration.  
[Evidence-based sentencing] advocates presumably think that 
point is intuitive: lock up the people who are the riskiest, and 
you will be preventing more crimes.  But that intuition 
oversimplifies the relationship between incarceration and 
recidivism.”170  When you consider how high the Pennsylvania 
model’s error rate is, incarcerating those that the tool deems 
the riskiest would not reduce crime for forty-three percent of 
the “high-risk” population because the tool falsely predicted 
that they would recidivate. 
 
Certain types of so-called “higher-risk” defendants 
might be less responsive to enhanced penalties and therefore 
might be more vulnerable to its criminogenic effects.171  If this 
is the case, lengthening high-risk defendants’ sentences might 
 
168 See How Judges Are Elected, The United Judicial System of 
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increase the risk they pose after they are released, as some 
scholars have suggested.172  This is one of the major 
drawbacks of using a second-generation risk assessment tool 
that Pennsylvania has chosen.  As discussed earlier, third- 
and fourth-generation tools are augmented with information 
about a defendant’s criminogenic needs—that is, the 
deficiencies most strongly correlated with risk of future 
criminality.  This allows actors within the criminal justice 
system to tailor sentencing conditions to target for 
intervention people most likely to benefit from correctional 
programming.173  Without information on the elasticity to 
incarceration, second-generation risk assessment tools have 
limited utility in achieving their stated goal of reducing 
incarceration, even setting aside their problems with accuracy 




Reducing incarceration rates is a laudable goal.  But 
evidence-based sentencing simply is not the answer to that 
problem.  Advocates of risk assessment should use caution 
when proclaiming actuarial risk assessment is the “new way 
forward.”  When examining the statistical reliability of the 
tools, proponents of risk assessment “have sometimes gone too 
far in describing the power of evidence-based practices to 
revolutionize the criminal justice system” as they currently 
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stand.174  Pennsylvania has made valiant efforts to be 
thoughtful about the issues actuarial risk assessment 
presents; however, despite these efforts, considerable issues 
remain.  We should be wary of promoting punishment based 
on future actions, especially when those estimates of future 
action are not as reliable as claimed.  Even if actuarial tools 
increase accuracy in predicting recidivism, the concerns 
outlined here outweigh the utility of the slight increase in 
accuracy.  In short, the criminal justice system needs to be 
conscious of systemic racism and take steps to dismantle the 
racial bias that plagues our system.  Given the current state 
of actuarial risk assessment, evidence-based sentencing will 
only further contribute to the disparate treatment defendants 
of color receive. 
 
174 Klingele, supra note 169. 
